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Abstract
It is puzzling that socioeconomic background greatly a⁄ects educational
choice. Distinguished from the explanations based on expected utility theory,
this paper attempts to explore the psychological mechanisms of generating ed-
ucational identity1 and schooling choice. It o⁄ers a self-signaling model where
(1) it incorporates self-esteem concerns into the agent￿ s payo⁄ function, (2) the
investment in schooling not only signals her cognitive ability but also brings the
agent into cognitive dissonance and reduction when the perceptions of ability
are time-dependent. Using this model, I show a more discriminating analysis
of educational choice which combines multi-dimensional factors including so-
cioeconomic background, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. I identify the
conditions under which the high ability agent fails to invest in education. The
quality of school and the preschooling are key variables. The model suggests
that public policy can help poor children by improving both the early and later
education quality at school.
Keywords: identity, educational choice, poverty
JEL: D81, I30
1Educational identity refers to how one perceives one￿ s own ability, the intrinsic cognition
of own ability and the motivation to engage in education. It is generated by adding the
analysis of emotional functionings such as self-esteem.
11 Introduction
Since the end of 1970s, overall wage inequality and educational di⁄erentials have
expanded in most OECD countries. This trend is coupled with a rise in the pay-
o⁄ to high education and skills because the demands for such labors exceed the
inadequate supply (Atkinson, 2003). Despite substantial increasing premiums
to high education, the college participation rates in the US increase more sharply
in the high income groups than in the low ones. The big puzzle is why, if to im-
prove education and skills becomes more ￿nancially rewarding, there are still so
high and fairly constant drop-out rates at high school among the economically
disadvantaged youth, especially when some of them are intellectually quali￿ed?
One explanation to the puzzle refers to imperfect capital markets. This im-
perfection results in short term credit constraints that prevent the poor from
a⁄ording an expensive education. Using data from the US and European coun-
tries, Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Blanden and Gregg (2004) and Vanden-
berghe (2007) conclude that only a very small proportion of the population in
developed countries face such problems to ￿nance college education. Another ex-
planation claims that poor children lack a good cultural and social environment
which is crucial to foster their cognitive, non-cognitive abilities and motivations
required for success at school. For example, Fordham and Ogbu (1986) empha-
size the role of culture and argue for the existence of an oppositional culture in
the non-dominating social groups that prohibits behaviors traditionally seen as
the prerogative for their mainstream counterparts.
These theories have shed some light on the relationship between persistent
poverty and schooling choice. However, three aspects of recent empirical inves-
tigations about group poverty question their e⁄ectiveness and require a more
concrete and discriminating theoretical analysis. Firstly, Burtless (1996) and
Kozol (1991) point out that children living in a poor segregated community may
only enter low quality schools with insu¢ cient school expenditure on facilities
and teachers. Low quality schools are poor in both teaching valuable skills and
promoting a student￿ s ideal image close to economically useful cultural norms.
This negatively a⁄ects the outcomes of children￿ s education. (Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2002)) Secondly, there exist peer e⁄ects leading to imitative behaviors in
disadvantaged neighborhoods. Elliott et al (2006) ￿nd that individual-level suc-
cesses signi￿cantly own to good parenting practice, positive climate of school
and peer groups. Thirdly, apart from cognitive ability, individual characteris-
tics such as motivations a⁄ect the eductional level one can achieve. According
to Carneiro and Heckman (2003), the percentage of drop-outs who are intel-
lectually competent with GED certi￿cate has exceeded 30% in the 17-year-old
population. Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) highlight that non-cognitive
abilities, measured as the degree of control individuals feel over their life and
perceptions of self-worth, are important for their educational achievements.
This study proposes a behavioral model which allows for an inclusive discus-
sion of the relationship between cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, socioeco-
nomic status and educational choice. For the sake of simplicity, the cognitive
ability is assumed to be independent of one￿ s family. Non-cognitive abilities
2such as educational motivations are closely related to one￿ s socioeconomic back-
ground. The latter often decides about the stock of preschool, the quality of
school and the social environment one faces. (see Figure 1)
Preschool ， School quality and
Peer influences
Cognitive ability
Educational choice Non-cognitive ability: motivation
Socioeconomic endowment
Figure 1. Educational choice, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities
Instead of assuming a highly rational agent who is competent for assessing
future earning distributions, this paper assumes that emotions greatly in￿ uence
judgement, and individuals￿subjective beliefs about returns of schooling are
often ambiguous and diverge from rational evaluations. Much of the new work
in ￿elds such as neuroscience and social psychology highlights the role played
by emotions as informational and motivational inputs into the decision making
process. Motivated by these insights, this paper on the one hand incoporates
a self-esteem demand into the utility function. On the other hand, the model
considers the supply side of the self-esteem. Investing in education is assumed
to self-signal some good or bad news about the level of cognitive ability. As the
perceptions of the cognitive ability are time-dependent, the agent experiences
cognitive dissonance. In order to reduce the dissonance, the agent needs to
ignore and reinterpret cognitions by modifying her memory at a cost. This
demand-supply psychological process allows the agent to adapt her preference
for schooling and ￿nally form a stable educational identity. This approach of
modelling is in line with Benabou and Tirole(2006), Oxoby(2004), Bodner and
Prelee (2003).
Departing from Akerlof and Kranton (2000 & 2002) who introduce exoge-
nous psychological costs related to one￿ s social category, this paper attempts to
endogenize the psychological costs by exploring the demand-supply psycholog-
ical mechanism of self-esteem pursuit. The central conclusion of this paper is
that the high ability agent could fail to invest in education, as cognitive ability
is not the only reason to invest in education. One adapts her own preference
of schooling according to the speci￿c economic and social scenario she faces.
The most in￿ uential factors are school quality, preschool education and social
environment (progressive or conservative). The school quality is evaluated with
respect to how much market-valued skills and knowledge the school imparts
3and the student￿ s salience of self-esteem concerns of educational identity the
school promotes. When the school quality is high enough, the agent invests
in education. When the school quality is insu¢ cient, there exist di⁄ering psy-
chological self-ful￿lling alternatives determined by her preschool education and
social environment leading the agent to either investment or not. The threshold
of preschool edcuation for the agent to invest is sensitive to the initial beliefs
about the distribution of ability type. The paper is organized as follows: section
2 reviews the theory of identity and its empirical evidence on education which
rejects the "rational expectation" assumption of expected utility theory; the
model of the formation of educational identity is in section 3 where the qual-
ity of school, the preschool and initial beliefs about ability distribution matter
in educational choice; section 4 endogenizes the memory and shows how social
environment a⁄ects the resulting equilibria; it concludes in section 5.
2 Educational decision under uncertainty
Investment in education is risky. The uncertainty of the returns to schooling in
the labor market mainly comes from three types of risk. Firstly, the individual
experiences market risks. In a typical dynamic economy frequently exposed to
technical and orgnizational changes, labor supply shocks, etc, the value of hu-
man capitals and skills often shifts over time. As a result, workers with the same
educational levels may receive di⁄erent wages. Secondly, the individual cannot
be sure that she is able to successfully accomplish the education. Thirdly, given
her cognitive ability, the individual also cannot predict what her relative posi-
tion in the post-education earnings distribution will be. Bowles et al (2001a&b)
claim that even in a "Walrasian equilibrium" workers with the same productiv-
ity may not obtain the same wage because of informational asymmetry that the
employers do not know the worker￿ s labor e⁄orts. To reduce the cost of supervi-
sion, the employers pay di⁄erently to workers with di⁄erent incentive-enhancing
preferences which are independent of the cognitive ability. Using a collection
of available empirical surveys, Bowles et al (2001b) estimate that, on average,
only 18% of the returns to schooling are generated by cognitive abilities while
a substantial portion, roughly 82%, remain unexplained.
Based on the expected utility theory, Levhari and Weiss (1974) adopt a
standard model for schooling choice under uncertainty. The theory relies on a
crucial assumption that subjective and objective beliefs of the wage distribution
coincide. However, in reality, individuals often fail to obtain precise knowledge
of wage distribution and instead create a subjective judgement with biases and
errors.
An increasing amount of literature has cast doubt on the general validity of
expected utility theory in disentangling the puzzle of schooling choice. Firstly,
evidence especially from psychology and brain science (for a general review,
see Loewenstein et al. (2001)) supports that emotional reactions to an uncer-
tain situation often diverge from cognitive evaluation of the uncertainty and
risk. Secondly, economists such as Dominitz and Manski (1996) have designed a
4computer-based survey of high school students and college undergraduates in US
to elicit the various earning expectations and beliefs about earnings. Their main
￿ndings show a common opinion among the respondents that one￿ s own future
earnings are rather uncertain. A college degree is believed to have a positive
e⁄ect on earnings, but the respondents are more uncertain about their earnings
conditional on a bachelor￿ s degree than that on a lower degree. There is also
substantial within-group (e.g. the female high school group) variation in earning
expectations and in beliefs about current earnings distributions. When asked
about the distribution of earnings, most respondents tend to overestimate the
degree of inequality in American society. Finally, Carneiro, Hansen and Heck-
man (2003), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005 & 2006) have identi￿ed the
importance of psychological costs in the choice of schooling when accounting for
uncertainty and sequential revelation of information.
If the subjective beliefs of wage distribution are di⁄erent from the objective
beliefs, the question arises what determines the formation of subjective beliefs
about the returns to schooling. Psychological studies have long documented the
profound e⁄ects of self-esteem on individuals￿thinking process and action choice
(Nathaniel Branden, 1969). Individuals experience self-esteem in the form of
emotional feelings. This emotion is a product of self-evaluation of the bene￿cial
or harmful e⁄ects of some aspects of reality on the individual. The feeling
of liking and disliking serves as information directly in￿ uencing the decision
process. For the individual uncertain about where she stands with respect to
her own ability, each new choice can provide a bit of good or bad "news".
In response to the growing psychological literature on self-esteem, Akerlof
and Kranton (2002) are the ￿rst to emphasize the psychological aspects of educa-
tional choice by introducing exogenous psychological gains and costs determined
by their own social category. They propose a utility function that incorporates
"identity" (self-image concerns) as a motivation for educational behavior. Iden-
tity, associated with a certain social category, de￿nes how people in this category
should behave. They also claim that each social category imposes an ￿identity￿
on its members, which creates the relevant psychological and social costs when
the individuals violate the identity. The psychological and social costs are de-
rived from (1) the di⁄erence between the agent￿ s own characteristics and the
ideal of the assigned category, (2) the di⁄erence between the agent￿ s schooling
choice and the schooling level in the ideal social category. Wichardt (2007) uses
an evolutionary argument to justify the preference for identity-consistent behav-
ior. Human beings are psychologically programmed to conform to certain social
norms in their group, which could greatly facilitate the long-run cooperations
with other group members.
Based on the previous utility settings, Akerlof and Kranton (2002) then con-
struct a game-theoretic model where schools promote a single social category
and the students choose between the ideal "academic identity" and an iden-
tity ￿tting their social backgrounds. When the students hold two contradictory
ideas simultaneously, the phenomena is termed "cognitive dissonance". When
experiencing this dissonance, individuals have a fundamental cognitive drive to
reduce it by modifying the existing belief, or by rejecting one of the contradic-
5tory ideas at a psychological cost. A signi￿cant example is when the cognitive
dissonance is so large that the psychological costs of keeping an ideal "academic
identity" are greater than the bene￿ts of future wages and of an ideal self-image.
Students from low social class are often trapped in such a situation and then
reject the main-stream schools and choose to be drop-outs. It is necessary to
point out that the Akerlof-Kranton model is insightful in explaining why some
individuals fail in educational achievements. However, this model also suggests
that there is not much we can do to reduce the psychological costs which hamper
the poor students to escape poverty. Further research is necessary to understand
the nature of the psychological costs. This will allow us to identify instruments
that the public policy can use to help the poor.
3 The Formation of an "Educational Identity"
3.1 The Assumptions
3.1.1 Endowment
There are three stages in the model depicting the formation process of an ed-
ucational identity. At stage 0, the agent receives some signal ￿ indicating the
agent￿ s cognitive ability type as ￿i (either ￿H or ￿L). This signal ￿ contains
information such as the result of an IQ test by professional valuations or judge-
ments based on the daily learning activities etc2. Assume that the cognitive







with probability 1 ￿ ￿ (1)
At stage 0, the agent has also formed initial subjective beliefs (￿; 1￿￿) over
the cognitive type (￿H; ￿L) as shown in (1). The subjective beliefs (￿;1 ￿ ￿),
however, are in￿ uenced by her own family, communities and social networks.
The lower ￿ is, the more pessimistic the agent becomes from the social com-
munities. For example, when faced with a number of academic failures around
her, the agent from a disadvantaged community has a lower prior belief ￿ that
she could be high ability type than her counterparts in an a› uent commu-
nity. Moreover, the agent is endowed with some preschool education S0 > 0,
such as intellectual recognitions from parents, or successful performances and
experiences of acquiring knowledge, etc.
2￿i is the cognitive type the agent perceives upon signal ￿ at stage 0; at stage 1, based on
a new signal, the agent also gets another perception which might be di⁄erent from ￿i. The
agent￿ s educational decision is informationally and motivationally oriented. Therefore, the
true cognitive ability of the agent is not discussed in this paper.
63.1.2 Self-perceived ability from action a
At stage 1, the agent makes her investment decision of education a 2 f0;1g
at school. The investment cost of schooling ci depends only on her cognitive
ability3 shown in (2). The high cognitive type agent spends less time and e⁄orts
than the low type to accomplish the same tasks, performances and degrees. With
a constant return r to the educational investment a, the stock of schooling thus
adds to S1. The return r is independent of the ability type, but only a⁄ected
by the school teaching quality, with respect to the market-valued skills and
knowledge it imparts to the agent.4 Conditional on ￿i, the returns to schooling
the agent expects to receive in the future labor market is ￿iS1. These returns
to schooling are determined only by cognitve factors.
ci =
￿
cH for the high ability
cL for the low ability ; cH < cL (2)
S1 = S0 + ar (3)
Distinguished from its conventional dual-role5, putting e⁄orts and investing
in schooling now becomes a process of exploring and reevaluating one￿ s own
ability. Action a is purely self-signaling, from which the agent adopts the per-
spective of an outside observer to infer the level of her own ability. Figure 2
shows the extensive form of a two-stage self-signaling game. To be speci￿c,
at stage 1, without knowing her true ability, the agent only holds prior beliefs
about her type (￿; 1 ￿ ￿) with respect to (￿H; ￿L). At stage 2, the agent gains
new evidence from action a = 0 or 1 and infers this ability. For ￿H, the proba-
bilities of investing (I) and not investing (NI) in schooling are xH and 1 ￿ xH;
for ￿L, the corresponding probabilities are xL and 1 ￿ xL. After action a, the
agent changes her beliefs from (￿;1 ￿ ￿) to (b ￿(a);1 ￿ b ￿(a)). Assume the agent
is sophisticated enough to calculate Bayesian probability, using Bayes￿rule, the
relationship between the posterior and the prior beliefs are described below in
(4) and (5). As a result, the perceived ability changes to v(a) 2 [￿L;￿H] in (6)
and (7).
3Assume a perfect credit market so that only ability matters and there is no credit con-
straint for the low-income kids.
4In the relatively short-run, we reasonably assume that the market environment doesn￿ t
change. At school, the uncertainties of the returns to schooling do not come from market
risks.
5On the one hand, schooling is basically regarded as a process for skill and human capital
accumulations which has a direct impact on labor productivity. On the other hand, schooling
demonstrates one￿ s ability to future employers in the labor market. Spence(1973) describes
how agents choose di⁄erent levels of education to signal a known ability in the labor market.
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Figure 2. Two-stage self-signalling game
b ￿(1) =
￿xH




￿(1 ￿ xH) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ xL)
(5)
v(1) = b ￿(1)￿H + (1 ￿ b ￿(1))￿L (6)
v(0) = b ￿(0)￿H + (1 ￿ b ￿(0))￿L (7)
3.1.3 Memory and Self-esteem Utility
Apart from the long-term monetary returns to schooling ￿iS1, the agent also
takes into account the self-esteem reasons for engaging in schooling at stage 2.
From a psychological point of view, the agent has a digni￿ed and motivated need
to invest in schooling. This need becomes a source of pleasure and intrinsically
a⁄ects her sense of emotional well-being. The higher the cognitive ability the
agent perceives, the better self-image and the higher self-esteem she enjoys.
However, the cognitions of her ability are ambivalent and time-dependent. At
stage 0, the agent regards her ability as ￿i from the past signal ￿, while at stage
2, she reinterprets her ability as v(a) in the light of the new evidence "action
8a". The two cognitions may con￿ ict each other and the agent experiences a
psychological con￿ icting state termed as "cognitive dissonance".
To reduce the amount of dissonance, there is some information loss from
stage 0 (before action a) and some added information from action a. As a result,
the educational identity (an intrinsic cognition of the ability) combines both ￿i
and v(a), which is written as (￿￿i+ (1￿￿)v(a)). Variable ￿ objectively measures
the memory lapse the agent experiences about ￿i at stage 2. To be speci￿c, at
stage 2, the agent is aware of her initial cognition ￿i with probability ￿, she no
longer recalls it and replaces it to the new cognition v(a) with probability 1￿￿.
Assume that memory can be imperfect and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Furthermore, this ￿ also
meaningfully describes the degree of di⁄erence between being a "progressive"
type (￿ = 0, only looking at the updated evidence action a about her cognitive
ability) and a "conservative" type (￿ = 1, only recalling the past experience
about her cognitive ability). The larger ￿ is, the more conservative the agent
is, the more the agent regards her initial cognition ￿i more important than the
new one v(a), and vice versa. Extreme cases are when ￿ = 0 or 1, the agent
totally eliminates the dissonance and con￿ ict, and realizes absolute consistency.
Assume the agent at stage 0 has optimally assigned weights ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ to
￿i and v(a). The value of ￿ is chosen as a trade-o⁄ between the agent￿ s social
pressure in￿ uences and her pursuit of individual interests. The endogeneity
of this variable ￿ is discussed in the later section. At stage 1, given memory
variable ￿, the total utility combining the monetary returns ￿iS1 and educational
identity-speci￿c emotion q(￿￿i + (1 ￿ ￿)v(a))S1 is indicated in (8). Note that
savouring parameter q > 0 measures the salience of the agent￿ s self-esteem
concerns of her educational identity at stage 2, which is signi￿cantly related
to how strongly the school shapes its students to conform to its educational
cultures and norms. For a brief overview of the agent￿ s actions and utilities,
refer to table 1.
￿iS1 + q(￿￿i + (1 ￿ ￿)v(a))S1 (8)
9Stage 2 Stage 1
School decision:
1 or 0 = a , to
maximize total
utility in stage 2
Total Utility includes the monetary
returns and the self-esteem concerns:
( ) [ ] i i i ac ar S a v q - + - + + ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 0 l lq q
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(2) r is the imparted skills and
human capital after investment at
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(3) The investment cost { } L H i c c c , ˛
(4) q is the parameter measuring
self-esteem or identity concerns.
(1) Signals indicates the
cognitive ability { } L H i q q q , ˛
(2) Initial subjective beliefs




(3) Optimally choose recall
ratel : with probability λ
the agent is aware of her
initial cognition
i q , with
probability l - 1   she adopt s
a new cognition ) (a v .
Stage 0
Table 1: Settings and actions in the three stages
3.2 Investment decision
3.2.1 Maximization and self-signaling equilibria
At stage 1, the agent optimally selects action a, taking into account not only
the long-term cognitive component of the returns to schooling, but also her
anticipated self-esteem experienced from action a at the stage 2. Therefore, the




U(￿i;a;￿;S0) = [￿i + q (￿￿i + (1 ￿ ￿)v(a))](S0 + ar) ￿ aci (9)
The agent chooses to invest a = 1, when the total payo⁄s from investing are
larger than not investing. The decision criterion (the incentive to invest) writes
Wi = U(￿i;1;￿;S0) ￿ U(￿i;0;￿;S0) (10)
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Self-esteem utility: What ability type of person I am?
Two conflicting self-perceptions of ability: i q   at st age
0, ) (a v inferred from action a at school. They are
linked by memory reconstruction parameterl .
( ) r S a v i + - + 0 )) ( ) 1 ( ( l lq
Educational choice a { } 1 , 0 ˛   at stage 1,  to maximize
the total utility includes both the monetary rewards and
self-esteem utility subtracted by the cost i c
( ) [ ] i i i ac ar S a v q - + - + + ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 0 l lq q
Self-perceived  ability ) (a v at
stage  2   derived  according  to
Bayes’  Rule
Initial subjective  beliefs
( ) r r - 1 , over cognitive
type ( ) L H q q ,
（9）- (10)
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Figure 3. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Self-signalling Game
In order to obtain a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in this self-signaling game,
assume that the agent is rational in the two senses: she maximizes her utility in
(9) and there is a set of strategies and beliefs (a;b ￿(a)) (see equation (4)-(7))such
that, at any stage of the game, strategies are optimally given the beliefs, and
the beliefs are obtained from equilibrium strategies and observed actions using
Bayes￿rule. (see Figure 3)
Proposition 1 Given a set of parameters (￿H;￿L;cH;cL), internal traits (q;￿;￿),
external constraints (S0;r), there exists a uniquely dominating equilibrium under
the following speci￿c conditions:
Equilibrium A: "no investment equilibrium", xH = xL = 0; with v(0) = v6
and v(1) = ￿H
7;when
￿Hr + q￿￿Hr + q(1 ￿ ￿)[￿H(S0 + r) ￿ vS0] ￿ cH (C1)
Equilibrium B: "separating equilibrium", xH = 1;xL = 0; with v(1) = ￿H
and v(0) = ￿L;when
￿Hr + q￿￿Hr + q(1 ￿ ￿)[￿H(S0 + r) ￿ ￿LS0] ￿ cH (C2)
￿Lr + q￿￿Lr + q(1 ￿ ￿)[￿H(S0 + r) ￿ ￿LS0] ￿ cL (C3)
6De￿ne v = ￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿)￿L.
7Equation (4) and (6) is invalid in the "no investment" equilibrium. Now reasonably
suppose that given the agent invests in schooling, v(1) = ￿H in equilibrium A.
11Equilibrium C: "semi-separating equilibrium", xH = 1;0 < xL < 1; with
v(0) = ￿L;v < v(1) < ￿H;when
￿Lr + q￿￿Lr + q(1 ￿ ￿)[v(1)(S0 + r) ￿ ￿LS0] = cL (C4)
Equilibrium D: "full investment equilibrium", xH = xL = 1, with v(0) =
￿L
8;v(1) = v;when
￿Lr + q￿￿Lr + q(1 ￿ ￿)[v(S0 + r) ￿ ￿LS0] ￿ cL (C5)
Proposition 1 tells us that the agent only falls into one of the equilibria A, B,
C or D. It depends on which of the conditions (C1)-(C5) are satis￿ed considering
her external constraints (S0;r) and internal traits (q;￿;￿)9. In ￿gure 4, A, B,
C and D respectively represent the space of the four equilibria. The boundaries
separating the four equilibria are ￿A; ￿B and ￿D (from the right to the left).
They are derived from conditions (C1), (C3) and (C5). A particular equilibrium
is a result of the agent￿ s S0; r and ￿.
Figure 4. Four equilibria, S0; r and ￿
3.2.2 The relationship between ￿; r and S0 and the equilibria
Proposition 2 The probability of investing increases when:
(1) the preschool education S0 increases
(2) the teaching quality r increases
8Equation (5) and (7) are invalid in the "full investment" equilibrium. Now reasonably
suppose that given the agent does not invest in schooling, v(0) = ￿L in equilibrium D.
9There are situations which satisfy both condition (C1) and (C2). For this overlapping
part, the agent is better-o⁄ in equilibrium A of no investment than equilibrium B. Therefore,
the agent chooses not to invest. For details, refer to the appendix.
12(3) the more progressive (the lower ￿) the agent is
In Figure 4, we can see that (1) for the high ability agent, as S0 (or r)
increases or ￿ decreases, the agent is more likely to be in space B, C or D than
in space A, (2) for the low ability agent, as S0 (or r) increases or ￿ decreases,
the agent is more likely to be in space C or D than in space A or B.
Corollary 3 Given the parameters (￿H;￿L;cH;cL), internal traits (q;￿;￿), there
exist three scenarios according to the school quality:
(1) At good quality schools where r ￿ cL
(1+q)￿L; only the "full investment"
equilibrium D exists (Figure 5).
(2) At medium quality schools where cH
(1+q)￿H ￿ r < cL
(1+q)￿L; there exist three
potential equilibria B, C and D (Figure 6).
(3) At poor quality schools where r < cH
(1+q)￿H ; there exist four potential
equilibria A, B, C and D10 (Figure 7).
In Figure 5, as the quality of the school is good, both the high and the low
type can acquire enough market-valued skills and knowledge. Therefore, it is






Figure 5. Full investment when r ￿ cL
(1+q)￿L
In Figure 6, where the school quality is medium, the agent is in equilibria
B, C or D. The high type always invests as the returns to education at the
medium quality school is pro￿table to her. For the low type, the equilibrium
she is in depends on (S0;￿). Now assign a value to ￿, as shown in the ￿gure,
when 0 < S0 ￿ S
￿B
0 , the low type agent is in equilibrium B where she does
not invest; when S
￿B
0 < S0 < S
￿D
0 , she is in equilibrium C where she invests
randomly at probability p11;when S0 ￿ S
￿D
0 , she is in equilibrium D where she
invests. Figure 6 also shows that when r increases, the equilibrium boundaries
￿B and ￿D shift to the left, therefore equilibrium B shrinks while the domain
of the equilibria C and D expands.
10The boundaries separating equilibria A, B, C and D are, respectively, ￿A; ￿B and ￿D.
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Figure 6. Three equilibria as r increases when
cH
(1+q)￿H ￿ r < cL
(1+q)￿L
In Figure 7, where the school quality is poor, the agent is in equilibria A,
B, C or D. The equilibrium she is in depends on (S0;￿). Assign a value to ￿;as
shown in the ￿gure, for the high type, only when S0 ￿ S
￿A
0 she invests, otherwise
she does not invest. For the low type, when 0 < S0 ￿ S
￿B
0 , she is in equilibria
A or B where she does not invest; when S
￿B
0 < S0 < S
￿D
0 , the low type is in
equilibrium C where she invests randomly at probability p;when S0 ￿ S
￿D
0 , she
is in equilibrium D where she invests. Moreover, as r increases, the equilibrium
boundaries ￿A; ￿B and ￿D shift to the left, therefore the domain of equilibrium
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Figure 7. Four equilibria as r increases when r < cH
(1+q)￿H
3.3 Impacts of salience parameter q and initial belief ￿
3.3.1 Salience parameter q on the thresholds of r








@q < 0 and@r2
@q < 0 show that the higher the salience of self-esteem con-
cerns of educational identity, the lower the thresholds r1 and r2 are. Other
conditions equal, both the high and low type agents are more likely to invest
in schooling. From the school￿ s point of view, the standards of school quality
("good", "medium" or "poor") not only depends on how much market-valued
skills and knowledge the school can impart to its students, but also on how the
school develops a climate that emphasizes the self-esteem concerns of academic
achievement among its students.
3.3.2 Salience parameter q on the thresholds of S0
When the school quality is relatively low, the choice of investment is sensitive
to the initial condition S0. For the high type agent at a poor quality school,
she invests in schooling when S0 > S
￿A
0 (Figure 7). For the low type, at a
medium or poor quality school, she invests when S0 ￿ S
￿D












Given the level of preschool education S0, the higher q the lower the thresh-
olds are, the more likely both type agents invest in schooling. For the high type,
the perceived ability of investing in equilibrium B v(1) = ￿H is higher than that
of not investing in equlibrium A v(0) = v. The higher emotional concerns about
educational identity, the more weight she puts on the di⁄erence between ￿H and
v, the more motivated the agent invests in schooling. Similarly, for the low type,
the perceived ability of investing in equilibrium D v(1) = v is higher than that
of not investing in equlibrium C v(0) = ￿L. The higher emotional concerns
about the perceived ability, the more weight she puts on the di⁄erence between
v and ￿L, the more motivated the low type agent invests in schooling.
3.3.3 Initial belief ￿ on the thresholds of S0
As for the impact of the initial belief ￿ on the threshold of S0, it di⁄ers in the











For the high type, the threshold S
￿A
0 increases with initial belief ￿. It implies
that at a poor quality school the more optimistic the high type agent initially
is, the lower the probability that she invests. This is because when ￿ is greater,
the di⁄erence between the perceived ability from equilibrium B "investing" and
equilibrium A "not investing", ￿H ￿v, becomes smalller, the less motivated the
15agent wants to invest. Strikingly, the initial belief ￿ has a contrasting in￿ uence
on the low type agent. As the initial belief ￿ increases, the threshold S
￿D
0
decreases. At a medium or poor quality school, the more optimistic the low type
agent initially is, the more likely the agent is to invest in schooling. The same
reasoning holds for the low type agent: the di⁄erence between the perceived
ability from equilibrium D of investing and equilibrium C of not investing, v￿￿L,
increases when ￿ becomes larger.
4 Cognitive investment: the endogeneity of ￿
and the in￿ uence of social environment
4.1 The decision function
Remembering is an active reconstructive process rather than an exact record
of the actual experiences. Assume that at stage 0 the agent optimally chooses
her memory ￿ to reduce the cognitive dissonance by balancing between the fol-
lowing two aspects. On the one hand, referring to (10) and proposition 2(3),
the agent has a demand for certain memory level ￿ to motivate investment in
schooling. The lower ￿ is, the more likely she invests. On the other hand, when
confronting the contradictory cognitions, the agent makes e⁄orts to ignore, dis-
tort and reinterpret some evidence. To modify memory exhausts real resources,
time, psychic stress from repression, etc. The cost of modifying memory is re-
lated to the social environment and peer in￿ uences the agent has access to. For
the sake of simplicity, assume a linear memory supply function M(￿); where
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Hence, the agent chooses the optimal level of memory ￿ according
to (11). The ￿rst derivative is shown in (12):
Max
0￿￿￿1
U(￿i;a;￿;S0) = (￿i + q￿￿i + q(1 ￿ ￿)v(a))(S0 + ar) ￿ aci ￿ M(￿) (11)
@U
@￿
= q(￿i ￿ v(a))(S0 + ar) ￿ M
0
(￿) (12)
Specify the cost function in two symmetric extremes. In the conservative
social environment, set M(￿) = m(1 ￿ ￿); m > 0. Figure 8 shows that being
a pure conservative (￿ = 1) is costless; the smaller ￿, the more costs the agent
pays, m is the marginal cost of reducing a unit of ￿. The more conservative
the environment is, the higher marginal cost m is. On the contrary, in the
progressive social environment, set M(￿) = m￿. Figure 9 describes that being
a pure progressive ￿ = 0 requires no cost; when the agent chooses larger ￿,
it incurs more cost, m is the marginal cost of adding a unit of ￿. The more
progressive the environment is, the higher marginal cost m is.
16) (l M
l 1 0
Figure 8. M(￿) = m(1 ￿ ￿)
) (l M
l 1 0
Figure 9. M(￿) = m￿
4.2 The results
4.2.1 The high type
In the case of conservative environment, the high type optimally chooses ￿ =
1 because it is costless to maintain a good self-image ￿H as a conservative.
Investment decision only depends on the quality of school r. At a good or
medium quality school (Figure 10 or 11), the high type agent always invests.
At a poor quality school, to invest not only fails to improve the self-image
￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿)v(1) as good as ￿H, but also incurs extra psychological cost of
lowering her memory ￿:Therefore, the high type does not invest and remains to





























Figure 12. Poor quality school, high type, conservative
environment
In the progressive environment, being conservative ￿ = 1 is more costly
than in the conservative environment. The high type increases ￿ only when the
preschool education S0 exceeds some critical threshold.
At a good quality school (Figure 13), the agent will always be in equilibrium
D where she invests, ￿ = 0 and the self-image is v. When S0 > SGP, the agent
invests and ￿nds it better-o⁄ to obtain a good self-image ￿H by increasing ￿
from 0 to 1.
￿ =
￿
0 if S0 ￿ SGP
1 if S0 > SGP ;SGP =
m
q(￿H ￿ v)






Figure 13. Good quality school, high type, progressive
environment
At a medium quality school (Figure 14), the agent invests. In equilibrium
B, ￿ = 0 because it allows the agent to maintain a good self-image ￿H at
no psychological cost. In equilibrium C, ￿ remains 0 and self-image v when
S0 ￿ SMP. When S0 > SMP, the agent ￿nds it a⁄ordable to obtain a good




0 if S0 ￿ SMP
￿B if S0 > SMP ;SMP =
m
q(￿H ￿ ￿L)
￿ r > S2
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Figure 14. Medium quality school, high type, progressive
environment
At a poor quality school, ￿ depends not only on the preschool education S0,
but also on the marginal cost of increasing ￿:
When m < cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr (Figure 15), as S0 increases, ￿ changes from 0
to 1. Because the cost of increasing ￿ is lower than the sum of opportunity cost
￿(1+q)￿Hr and investment cost cH, the high type agent maintains a good self-
image ￿H by being conservative instead of investing. The agent is in equilibrium
A of no investment.
19￿ =
￿
0 if S0 ￿ SPP1
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Figure 15. Poor quality school, high type, progressive
environment ￿(1 + q)￿Hr + cH > m
When m ￿ cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr (Figure 16), the cost of being conservative is
higher than the sum of the opportunity cost ￿(1 + q)￿Hr and the investment
cost cH. The high type agent chooses to be progressive ￿ = 0 regardless of
her self-image. Only when S0 is higher than SPP2; the high type agent is in
equilibrium B, where she chooses ￿ = ￿B and obtains a good self-image ￿H. In
this highly progressive environment, whatever ￿ is, the agent invests in schooling




0 if S0 ￿ SPP2
￿B if S0 > SPP2 ;SPP2 =
m
q(￿H ￿ ￿L)
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Figure 16. Poor quality school, high type, progressive
environment cH ￿ (1 + q)￿H ￿ m
204.2.2 The low type
In the conservative environment, the choice of memory ￿ is more sophisticated
for the low type agent than for the high type agent. On the one hand, a lower
￿ brings a better self-image, on the other hand, it adds additional psychological
costs to go against the conservative social environment. At a good or medium
quality school, there exists a certain critical threshold above which the low type
agent can a⁄ord to be progressive.




1 if S0 ￿ SGC
0 if S0 > SGC ; SGC =
m
q(v ￿ ￿L)
￿ r > 0




Figure 17. Good school, low type, conservative environment
At a medium quality school (Figure 18),
￿ =
￿
1 if S0 ￿ SMC
0 if S0 > SMC ;SMC =




When the preschool education S0 ￿ SMC; the low type agent is conservative
and in equilibrium B of no investment. When S0 > SMC; the low type agent is
progressive and in equilibrium D where she invests.
212
0 S 3







Figure 18. Medium quality school, low type, conservative
environment
At a poor quality school, the conservative environment worsens the situation
for the low type agent. She does not invest at all because the economic and emo-
tional payo⁄s do not compensate the investment cost cL. In equilibrium A, "not
investing" brings better news v than the initial self-image ￿L. In equilibrium
B, C or D, "not investing" brings ￿L as self-image. Therefore, the agent adapts
￿ to stay in this no-investment equilibrium A rather than equilibria B, C or D.
The optimal chosen value of ￿ does not change monotonically as S0 increases.
When S0 ￿ SPC, the bene￿ts from a higher self-image, ￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)v(0),
cannot compensate the psychological costs of lowering ￿. When S0 > SPC,
the agent gets better-o⁄ by being more progressive but keeping the value of
￿ on the edge of equilibrium A, ￿A: When the marginal psychological costs
m ￿
￿
1￿￿(cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr); the threshold SPC < S1





1 if S0 ￿ SPC
0 if SPC < S0 ￿ S1
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Figure 19. Poor quality school, low type, conservative
environment m ￿
￿
1￿￿(cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr)
When the mental costs m >
￿





1 if S0 ￿ SPC










Figure 20. Poor quality school, low type, conservative
environment m >
￿
1￿￿(cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr)
In the progressive environment, the low type agent always ￿nds it optimal
to keep ￿ = 0 as a new self-image v(a) is at least as good as the old one ￿L. It
requires no extra psychological costs. The investment choice for the low type
agent depends on the school quality. At a good quality school (Figure 21),
the agent is in equilibrium D. At a medium or poor quality school (in Figure
22), if 0 < S0 ￿ S2
0; the agent does not invest (in equilibrium A or B); if
S2
0 < S0 < S3
0, she is in equilibrium C and invests randomly at probability
cL￿r￿L+q￿LS0
q(r+S0) ; if S0 ￿ S3



























Figure 23. Poor quality school, low type, progressive
environment
To sum up, the agent forms various self-ful￿lling preferences for schooling
according to (S0;r) by shaping her memory ￿ at a cost under di⁄erent social
24environment. For the high type agent, investing sometimes brings bad news
about self-image and therefore she is anti-progress. At a good or medium qual-
ity school, she always invests whatever ￿ is. At a bad quality school, when
S0 > S1
0; the agent may invest. The decision depends on the social pressures
and environment. When the psychological cost of being conservative is relatively
low, the high type agent is conservative and does not invest. In a highly pro-
gressive environment where the psychological costs of being conservative is very
high, the high type agent becomes progressive. This psychological self-ful￿lling
alternative leads her to investment. For the low type agent, investing always
brings good news about self-image and therefore she is pro-progress. At a good
quality school, the agent always invests whatever ￿ is. At a medium or poor
quality school with progressive environment, the agent becomes progressive and
invests once S0 ￿ S3
0. In the conservative environment, the agent becomes pro-
gressive and invests only when S0 ￿ SMC > S3
0. However, at a poor school with
conservative environment, the low type agent cannot a⁄ord to invest and then
remains conservative.
5 Conclusion
Nowadays, schools are important social institutions for individual development.
This paper provides a framework to comprehend the relationship between the
socioeconomic background, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, and one￿ s edu-
cational choice. Several variables, in particular the school quality, the preschool
education and the social environment, are key to a⁄ect the youth￿ s schooling
choice. The conditions under which one fails to invest in education are carefully
identi￿ed.
This paper also provides a rich framework to re￿ ect on the deeply rooted
problems of low achievement for economically disadvantaged youth. It rejects
the "centrality of culture" view that an oppositional culture￿ prior values and
patterns of behavior in the non-dominating social groups￿ determines their
failure. Instead, it agrees with a new approach developed by Appadurai(2004)
and Sen and Nussbaum (1993) and Nussbaum (2000), which links the poverty
trap and the capacity to aspire. This capacity to aspire refers to meaningful and
reciprocal experiences relating motivations to commodities and to what people
actually do. However, given that the required economic and social rescources
are unequally distributed at both early age at home and later at school, the
capacity to aspire and to pursue personal development through education will
not be equal in the society. Compared to the privileged who have su¢ cient stock
of experiences and good opportunities to promote development, the poor have
a much smaller stock of experience and less frequent opportunities so that they
lack the motivation to invest in high education regardless of the rising economic
incentives in the labor market.
The theoretical framework developed in this paper also calls for more empir-
ical support concerning its assumptions and results. Both the theoretical and
empirical progress will enhance the understanding of the "poverty trap and low
25education" black box and help to evaluate what direct interventions to raise
academic attainment of the disadvantaged young will be e⁄ective.
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Appendix
Proposition 1: Four Equilibria
According to the investment criteria (10), the di⁄erence of the incentive to
invest between the two types:
WH ￿ WL = (￿H ￿ ￿L)(1 + q￿)r + cL ￿ cH > 0
Because of this monotonicity property, it is impossible that the low type
invest while the high type doesn￿ t. Equation xL(1￿xH) = 0 always holds. This
￿nally leads to several potential equilibria:
Equilibrium A: xH = xL = 0, then v(0) = v and v(1) = ￿H, it satis￿es,
WH ￿ 0 (C1), WL ￿ 012
Equilibrium B: xH = 1;xL = 0, then v(1) = ￿H and v(0) = ￿L, it satis￿es,
WH ￿ 0 (C2), WL ￿ 0 (C3)
Equilibrium C: xH = 1;1 > xL > 0, then v(0) = ￿L;v < v(1) < ￿H, it
satis￿es,
12As WH > WL; if WH ￿ 0; WL ￿ 0 also holds; if WL ￿ 0; WH ￿ 0 also holds.
28WH ￿ 0; WL = 0 (C4)
Equilibrium D: xH = xL = 1, then v(0) = ￿L;v(1) = v, it satis￿es,
WH ￿ 0; WL ￿ 0 (C5)
Equilibrium E: 1 > xH > xL = 0, then ￿L < v(0) < v and v(1) = ￿H, it
satis￿es,
WH = 0 (C6); WL < 0
From (4),(5),(6) and (7), in all the equilibria, b ￿(1) > b ￿(0) and v(1) > v(0):
Once condition (C6) holds, (C1) holds too. Therefore, Equilibria A and E
are always coexist. Both types are better o⁄ in the no-investment Equilibrium
A than E according to her utility function (10), therefore using Pareto criterion
we can select Equilibrium A and rule out E. Moreover, we can always ￿nd an
domain that Equilibrium A and B coexist because cH satis￿es both (C1) and
(C2). Both types are better o⁄in the no-investment Equilibrium A than B if we
compare the utilities according to(10). Therefore, we can rule out Equilibrium
B whenever it coexists with A.
Derived from proposition 1 (C1)13, (C3) and (C5), curve ￿A, ￿B and ￿D,
if exist, are the bounds of equilibria A, B, C and D (see Figue 4):
￿A = 1 ￿
cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr
q(￿H ￿ v)S0
(D1)
￿B = 1 ￿
cL ￿ (1 + q)￿Lr
q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r)
(D2)
￿D = 1 ￿
cL ￿ (1 + q)￿Lr
q(v ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r)
(D3)
which satisfy 0 ￿ ￿D < ￿B < ￿A ￿ 1
Proposition 2:
Whatever the high or low type, given ￿H > v(1) > v(0) > ￿L; S0 > 0; r > 0;
@Wi
@S0
= q(1 ￿ ￿)(v(1) ￿ v(0)) ￿ 0
@Wi
@r
= ￿i(1 + ￿q) + q(1 ￿ ￿)v(1) > 0
It is obvious that the higher S0 (or r) is, the higher the incentive (Wi) to
invest for both high and low ability agent.
13When Equilibrium B and A coexist, the latter equilibrium A dominates the former equi-
librium B. Therefore, the upper bound is not determined by (C2), but (C1).
29@W
@￿
= ￿q [(v(1) ￿ ￿i)(S0 + r) ￿ (v(0) ￿ ￿i)S0]
For the low type agent, @W
@￿ < 0 always holds, therefore the lower ￿ is, the
higher the incentive to invest.
For the high type agent, in equilibria B, C and D, she always invest. While
in equilibrium A with v(1) = ￿H and v(0) = v; therefore, @W
@￿ < 0 also holds.
Corollary 3: Relationships between ￿; r and S0 and the equilibria
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S1
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cL ￿ (1 + q)￿Lr
q (r + S0)
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q (r + S0)
3 (v ￿ ￿L)
Now under each condition of r, discuss the relationship between ￿ and S0:
(1) When r ￿
cL
(1 + q)￿L
: (see Figue 7) ￿A > 1;￿B ￿ 1;￿D ￿ 1







: (see Figue 8) ￿A ￿ 1;￿B < 1;￿D < 1
There is no equilibrium A. Equilibria B, C and D exist.




























> 0 =) As r rises, ￿B and ￿D shift to the left in Figure 8.
From (C4), we get v(1) =
￿cL + r￿L + q￿LS0 (￿ ￿ 1) + qr￿￿L
q (￿ ￿ 1)(r + S0)
From (4) and (6), xL =
￿(￿H ￿ v(1))





q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(￿ ￿ 1)(S0 + r)
￿cL + (1 + q)r￿L
￿ 1)
(3) When r <
cH
(1 + q)￿H
: (see Figue 9) ￿A < 1;￿B < 1;￿D < 1
There exist equilibria A, B, C and D.











































=) As r rises, ￿A; ￿B and ￿D shift to the left in Figure 9.
31The endogeneity of ￿
The main approach and steps to solve ￿ from (11) and (12) are: (a) Catego-
rize agent according to her (ability, preschool, school, environment). (b) Find
the potential equilibria according to her categorization. (c) In each potential
equilibrium, ￿nd ￿ that maximizes the utility in (11) considering the condition
(12). (d) Compare between those ￿s from di⁄erent equilibria, the utility of
which dominates the others is the solution ￿ to (11).
I. In the "conservative scenario":
1. For the high type, (11) and (12) are speci￿ed as:
In equilibrium A:
UA(￿H;0;￿;S0) = (￿H + q￿￿H + q(1 ￿ ￿)v)S0 ￿ m(1 ￿ ￿) (HA1)
@U
@￿
= q (￿H ￿ v)S0 + m > 0 (HA2)
In equilibrium B:
UB(￿H;1;￿;S0) = ￿H(1 + q)(S0 + r) ￿ cH ￿ m(1 ￿ ￿) (HB1)
@U
@￿
= m > 0 (HB2)
In equilibrium C:




= q(￿H ￿ v(1))(S0 + r) + m > 0 (HC2)
In equilibrium D:
UD(￿H;1;￿;S0) = (￿H + q￿￿H + q(1 ￿ ￿)v)(S0 + r)￿cH ￿m(1￿￿) (HD1)
@U
@￿
= q(￿H ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m > 0 (HD2)
(1) When r ￿ cL
(1+q)￿L, S0 > 0, there only exists equilibrium D. (Figure 10)
(HD2) shows the agent optimally chooses ￿ = 1.
(2) When cH
(1+q)￿H ￿ r < cL
(1+q)￿L, there could exist equilibria B, C and D
when S0 > 0. (Figure 11)
1) If 0 < S0 ￿ S2
0; the agent is in equilibrium B. (HB2) shows optimally
￿ = 1:
2) If S2
0 < S0 < S3
0; the agent is in equilibrium B or C.
In equilibrium B, (HB2) shows optimally ￿ = 1; In equilibrium C, (HC2)
shows optimally ￿ = ￿B ￿ "; " ! +0: The agent optimally chooses ￿ = 1 as
32UB(￿H;1;1;S0) > UC(￿H;1;￿B ￿ ";S0);
3) If S2
0 < S0 ￿ S3
0; the agent is in equilibrium B, C or D.
In equilibrium B shows optimally ￿ = 1; In equilibrium C, (HC2) shows
optimally ￿ = ￿B ￿ "; In equilibrium D, (HD2) shows optimally ￿ = ￿D:The
agent optimally chooses ￿ = 1 as
UB(￿H;1;1;S0) > UC(￿H;1;￿B ￿ ";S0)
UB(￿H;1;1;S0) > UD(￿H;1;￿D;S0)
(3) When r < cH
(1+q)￿H , there could exist equilibria A, B, C and D when
S0 > 0. (Figure 12)
1) If 0 < S0 ￿ S1
0;the agent is in equilibrium A. (HA2) shows optimally
￿ = 1:
2) If S1
0 < S0 ￿ S2
0;the agent could be in equilibrium A or B.
In equilibrium A, (HA2) shows optimally ￿ = 1; In equilibrium B, (HB2)
shows optimally ￿ = ￿A ￿ ": The agent then chooses ￿ = 1 as
UA(￿H;0;1;S0) > UB(￿H;1;￿A ￿ ";S0)
3) If S2
0 < S0 < S3
0;the agent could be in equilibrium A, B or C.
In equilibrium A, (HA2) shows optimally ￿ = 1; In equilibrium B, (HB2)
shows optimally ￿ = ￿A￿"; In equilibrium C, (HC2) shows optimally ￿ = ￿B￿".
The agent then chooses ￿ = 1 as
UA(￿H;0;1;S0) > UB(￿H;1;￿A ￿ ";S0)
UA(￿H;0;1;S0) > UC(￿H;1;￿B ￿ ";S0)
4) If S0 ￿ S3
0; the agent could be in equilibrium A, B, C or D.
In equilibrium A, (HA2) shows optimally ￿ = 1; In equilibrium B, (HB2)
shows optimally ￿ = ￿A￿"; In equilibrium C, (HC2) shows optimally ￿ = ￿B￿";
In equlibrium D, (HD2) shows optimally ￿ = ￿D: The agent then chooses ￿ = 1
as
UA(￿H;0;1;S0) > UB(￿H;1;￿A ￿ ";S0)
UA(￿H;0;1;S0) > UC(￿H;1;￿B ￿ ";S0)
UA(￿H;0;1;S0) > UD(￿H;1;￿D;S0)
2. For the low type: (11) and (12) are speci￿ed as:
In equilibrium A:
UA(￿L;0;￿;S0) = (￿L + q￿￿L + q(1 ￿ ￿)v)S0 ￿ m(1 ￿ ￿) (LA1)
@U
@￿
= q (￿L ￿ v)S0 + m (LA2)
33In equilibrium B:
UB(￿L;0;￿;S0) = (1 + q)￿LS0 ￿ m(1 ￿ ￿) (LB1)
@U
@￿
= m > 0 (LB2)
In equilibrium C:
UC(￿L;0;￿;S0) = (1 + q)￿LS0 ￿ m(1 ￿ ￿) (LC1)
@U
@￿
= m > 0 (LC2)
In equilibrium D:
UD(￿L;1;￿;S0) = (￿L + q￿￿L + q(1 ￿ ￿)v)(S0 + r) ￿ cL ￿ m(1 ￿ ￿) (LD1)
@U
@￿
= q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m (LD2)
(1) When r ￿ cL
(1+q)￿L, S0 > 0, there only exists equilibrium D. (Figure 13)
Given q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m ￿ 0; or S0 ￿ SGC; optiamlly ￿ = 1;
Given q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m < 0; or S0 > SGC; optiamlly ￿ = 0:
De￿ne SGC =
m
q (v ￿ ￿L)
￿ r
(2) When cH
(1+q)￿H ￿ r < cL
(1+q)￿L, there exists equilibria B, C and D. (Figure
14)
1) if 0 < S0 ￿ S2
0 : there exists equilibrium B.
Condition (LB2) shows optimally ￿ = 1:
2) if S2
0 < S0 < S3
0 : there could exist equilibrium B or C.
In equilibrium B, optimally ￿ = 1;In equilibrium C, condition (LC2) shows
optimally ￿ = ￿B ￿ ". The low type chooses ￿ = 1 as,
UB(￿L;0;1;S0) > UC(￿L;0;￿B ￿ ";S0)
3) if S0 ￿ S3
0 : there exist equilibrium B, C or D.
In equilibrium B and C, UB(￿L;0;1;S0) > UC(￿L;0;￿B ￿ ";S0)
In equilibrium D, condition FOC (LD2) shows two possibilities:
The ￿rst one, optimally ￿ = 0;when
q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m < 0;
34Compare with equilibrium B, then
If m < q(v ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ (cL ￿ (1 + q)￿Lr);
UB(￿L;0;1;S0) < UD(￿L;1;0;S0);optimally ￿ = 0
If q(v ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ (cL ￿ (1 + q)￿Lr) ￿ m < q(v ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r);
UB(￿L;0;1;S0) ￿ UD(￿L;1;0;S0);optimally ￿ = 1
The second one, optimally ￿ = ￿D;when
q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m ￿ 0;
Compare with equilibrium B, then
UB(￿L;0;1;S0) > UD(￿L;1;￿D;S0);optimally ￿ = 1
To conclude, when S0 ￿ SMC;￿ = 1; when S0 > SMC; ￿ = 0, where
SMC =
m + cL ￿ ￿Lr ￿ qvr
q (v ￿ ￿L)
> S3
0:
(3) When r < cH
(1+q)￿H ;there could exist equilibrium A, B, C or D.
Case 1 assume m ￿
￿
1￿￿(cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr); see Figure 15.
1) if 0 < S0 ￿ S1
0
In equilibrium A, conditions (LA2) shows,
When q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m ￿ 0;￿ = 1; when q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m < 0;￿ = 0:
2) if S1
0 < S0 ￿ S2
0
In equilibrium A, ￿ = ￿A as conditions (LA2) satis￿es
q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m < 0
In equilibrium B, conditions (LB2) shows that, ￿ = ￿A ￿ "
Compare equilibrium A and B, optimally ￿ = ￿A; as
UA(￿L;0;￿A;S0) > UB(￿L;0;￿A ￿ ";S0)
3) if S2
0 < S0 < S3
0
Similarly, in equilibrium A and B, optimally ￿ = ￿A:
In equilibrium C, (LC2) show ￿ = ￿B ￿ "
Compare equilibria A, B and C, optiamlly ￿ = ￿A as,
UA(￿L;0;￿A;S0) > UC(￿L;0;￿B ￿ ";S0)
354) if S0 ￿ S3
0;the low type could be in equilibrium A, B, C or D.
Similarly, in equilibria A, B and C, ￿ = ￿A
In equilibrium D, optimally ￿ = 0; as condition (LD2) satis￿es,
q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m < 0;￿ = 0
Compare A, B, C and D, optimally ￿ = ￿A as,
When q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m < 0; UA(￿L;0;￿A;S0) > UD(￿L;1;0;S0)
Case 2 assume m >
￿
1￿￿(cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr); see Figure 16.
1) if 0 < S0 ￿ S1
0
In equilibrium A, optimally ￿ = 1; as conditions (LA2) satis￿es,
q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m ￿ 0
2) if S1
0 < S0 ￿ S2
0
In equilibrium A, ￿ = ￿A when conditions (LA2) satis￿es
q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m < 0
￿ = 1 when condition (LA2) satis￿es
q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m ￿ 0
In equilibrium B, conditions (LB2) shows that, ￿ = ￿A ￿ "
Compare equilibria A and B,
When q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m < 0; optimally ￿ = ￿A; as
UA(￿L;0;￿A;S0) > UB(￿L;0;￿A ￿ ";S0)
When q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m ￿ 0; optimally ￿ = 1; as
UA(￿L;0;1;S0) > UB(￿L;0;￿A ￿ ";S0)
3) if S2
0 < S0 < S3
0
In equilibria A and B, as q(￿L ￿ v)S0 + m < 0; optimally ￿ = ￿A:
In equilibrium C, (LC2) show ￿ = ￿B ￿ "
Compare equilibria A, B and C, optiamlly ￿ = ￿A as,
UA(￿L;0;￿A;S0) > UC(￿L;0;￿B ￿ ";S0)
4) if S0 ￿ S3
0;the low type could be in equilibrium A, B, C or D.
Similarly, in equilibria A, B and C, ￿ = ￿A
In equilibrium D, optimally ￿ = 0; as condition (LD2) satis￿es,
q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) + m < 0





1￿￿(cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr) holds, SPC ￿ S1
0
if S0 ￿ SPC;￿ = 1;if SPC < S0 ￿ S1




1￿￿(cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr) holds, SPC > S1
0




II. In the "progressive scenario":
1. For the high type: (11) and (12) are speci￿ed as:
In equilibrium A:
UA(￿H;0;￿;S0) = (￿H + q￿￿H + q(1 ￿ ￿)v)S0 ￿ m￿ (HA3)
@U
@￿
= q(￿H ￿ v)S0 ￿ m (HA4)
In equilibrium B:
UB(￿H;1;￿;S0) = (1 + q)￿H (S0 + r) ￿ cH ￿ m￿ (HB3)
@U
@￿
= ￿m < 0 (HB4)
In equilibrium C:
UC(￿H;1;￿;S0) = (￿H + q￿￿H + q(1 ￿ ￿)v(1))(S0 + r) ￿ cH ￿ m￿ (HC3)
@U
@￿
= q(￿H ￿ v(1))(S0 + r) ￿ m (HC4)
In equilibrium D:
UD(￿H;1;￿;S0) = (￿H + q￿￿H + q(1 ￿ ￿)v)(S0 + r) ￿ cH ￿ m￿ (HD3)
@U
@￿
= q(￿H ￿ v)(S0 + r) ￿ m (HD4)
(1) When r ￿ cL
(1+q)￿L, S0 > 0;there exists equilibrium D. (Figure 17)








￿ r > 0
(2) When cH
(1+q)￿H ￿ r < cL
(1+q)￿L;S0 > 0;there exists equilibrium B, C or D.
(Figure 18)
1) When 0 < S0 ￿ S2
0, there exists equilibrium B.
(HB4) shows optimally ￿ = 0.
2) When S2
0 < S0 < S3
0; there could exist equilibrium B or C.
In equilibrium B, (HB4) shows optimally ￿ = ￿B:
In equilibrium C, (HC4) shows
When q(￿H ￿ v(1))(S0 + r) ￿ m ￿ 0; ￿ = ￿B ￿ "; " ￿! +0;as
UB(￿H;1;￿B;S0) > UC(￿H;1;￿B ￿ ";S0)
When q(￿H ￿ v(1))(S0 + r) ￿ m < 0; ￿ = 0
UB(￿H;1;￿B;S0) ￿ UC(￿H;1;0;S0) = q(￿H ￿ v(1))(S0 + r) ￿ m￿B
If q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m ￿ 0;
UB(￿H;1;￿B;S0) ￿ UC(￿H;1;0;S0)
If q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m > 0;
UB(￿H;1;￿B;S0) > UC(￿H;1;0;S0)
3) When S0 ￿ S3
0; there exist equilibrium B, C or D.
Likewise, compare equilibria B ,C and D, it shows
optimally ￿ = ￿B;when
q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m > 0
optimally ￿ = 0;when
q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m ￿ 0
Therefore, from 1), 2) and 3) we obtain, when S0 ￿ SMP;￿ = 0;when




￿ r > S2
0
(3) When r < cH
(1+q)￿H ;there exists equilibrium A, B, C or D.
Case1: assume m < cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr (Figure 19)
1) When 0 < S0 ￿ S1
0
38In equilibrium A, condition (HA4) shows that,
when q(￿H ￿ v)S0 ￿ m ￿ 0; or equivalently S0 ￿ SPP1 = m
q(￿H￿v);optimally
￿ = 0
when q(￿H ￿ v)S0 ￿ m > 0; or equivalently S0 > SPP1 = m
q(￿H￿v);optimally
￿ = 1;where
0 < SPP1 < S1
0
15
2) When S0 > S1
0
In equilibrium A, optimally ￿ = 1; as
q(￿H ￿ v)S0 ￿ m > 016
UA(￿H;0;1;S0) ￿ U(￿H;1;￿;S0)17
= (1 ￿ ￿)[q(￿H ￿ v(1))(S0 + r) ￿ m] + [￿(￿H + q￿H)r + cH] > 0 (when
m < cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr)
Therefore what other equilibria are, equilibrium A with ￿ = 1 is the optimal
choice.
Case 2: assume m ￿ cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr (Figure 20)
1) When 0 < S0 ￿ S2
0, obviously the agent chooses ￿ = 0
2) When S2
0 < S0 < S3
0; there exists equilibrium A, B or C.
Equilibrium A is not the candidate as it￿ s dominated by equilibrium B or C.
In equilibrium B, optimally ￿ = ￿B
In equilibrium C, ￿ = 0 if
q(￿H ￿ v(1))(S0 + r) ￿ m ￿ 0
otherwise, ￿ = ￿B ￿ "
Compare equilibria B and C:
UB(￿H;1;￿B;S0) ￿ UC(￿H;1;0;S0) = ￿B [q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m]
When q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m > 0; ￿ = ￿B as
UB(￿H;1;￿B;S0) > UC(￿H;1;0;S0)
When q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m ￿ 0; ￿ = 0 as
UB(￿H;1;￿B;S0) ￿ UC(￿H;1;0;S0)
Moreover, in equilibrium C, ￿ = ￿B ￿ " if
q(￿H ￿ v(1))(S0 + r) ￿ m > 0
Compare equilibria B and C, optimally ￿ = ￿B as
15Derived from m < cH ￿ (1 + q)￿Hr
16Derived from S0 > S1
0 > SPP1
17The utility of equilibrium B, C or D that the high type agent chooses to invest.
39UB(￿H;1;￿B;S0) > UC(￿H;1;￿B ￿ ";S0)
4) When S0 ￿ S3
0;there exists equilibrium A, B, C or D.
Apply the same procedure above to compare the equilibria A, B, C and D,
we get:
When q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m ￿ 0; optimally ￿ = 0
When q(￿H ￿ ￿L)(S0 + r) ￿ m > 0; optimally ￿ = ￿B
Therefore, in case 2:




￿ r > S2
0
2. For the low type: (11) and (12) are speci￿ed as:
In equilibrium A:
UA(￿L;0;￿;S0) = (￿L + q￿￿L + q(1 ￿ ￿)v)S0 ￿ m￿ (LA3)
@U
@￿
= q (￿L ￿ v)S0 ￿ m < 0 (LA4)
In equilibrium B:
UB(￿L;0;￿;S0) = (1 + q)￿LS0 ￿ m￿ (LB3)
@U
@￿
= ￿m < 0 (LB4)
In equilibrium C:
UC(￿L;0;￿;S0) = (1 + q)￿LS0 ￿ m￿ (LC3)
@U
@￿
= ￿m < 0 (LC4)
In equilibrium D:
UD(￿L;1;￿;S0) = (￿L + q￿￿L + q(1 ￿ ￿)v)(S0 + r) ￿ cL ￿ m￿ (LD3)
@U
@￿
= q(￿L ￿ v)(S0 + r) ￿ m < 0 (LD4)
(1) When r ￿ cL
(1+q)￿L, S0 > 0;there exists equilibrium D. (Figure 21)
(LD4) shows optimally ￿ = 0:
(2) When cH
(1+q)￿H ￿ r < cL
(1+q)￿L;there could exist equilibrium B, C or D.
(Figure 22)
1) if 0 < S0 ￿ S2
0; the agent is in equilibrium B. (LB4) shows ￿ = 0
402) if S2
0 < S0 < S3
0; the agent is in equlibrium B or C.
In equilibrium B, (LB4) shows ￿ = ￿B;In equilibrium C, (LC4) shows ￿ = 0:
Compare equilibria A and B, and optiamlly ￿ = 0 as,
UC(￿L;0;0;S0) > UB(￿L;0;￿B;S0)
3) if S0 ￿ S3
0;the agent is in equlibrium B, C or D.
Similarly, we ￿nd optiamlly ￿ = 0.
(3) When r < cH
(1+q)￿H ;there exists equilibrium A, B, C or D. (Figure 23)
Compare the candidate equilibria by using the similar procedure and it shows
when S0 > 0; optimally ￿ = 0.
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